


# IP Watermark Verification Based on Power Consumption Analysis

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
*cedric.marchand@univ-st-etienne.fr*

June 17, 2014




# Outline

- 1 Context
- 2 IP Watermarking
  - Concept
  - Application to IP Protection
- 3 Side Channel Verification of IP Watermark
  - Side Channel Verification
  - Correlation Computation Flow
  - Experimental results




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# IC Threats Model



# Consequences

## Example of Consequences of these threats

IP theft, Mask theft, Overbuilding chips: Loss of money

Competitor clone devices: Loss of money

Untested devices: Loss of money and reputation

Discarded devices: Loss of money and reputation

Old devices reuse: Loss of money and reputation

## In the worst case

In the case of security critical systems, use a counterfeit device could lead to very serious consequences.

# Fight these threats by designing SALWARES

## SALutary hardWARES: SALWARES


SALWARES use the same strategies and means as malwares but bring protection to the devices instead of malicious effect.

## Example of well-known SALWARES

- Physical Unclonable Function for authentication
- Memory encryption, Logic encryption
- Hardware metering, IC metering
- Remote activation
- IP Watermarking


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# Watermarking In General

## Embedding Process




Watermark embedding scheme.



# Watermarking In General

## Verification Process



Watermark detecting scheme.

# IP Watermarking

It possible to insert a watermark at different level <sup>1</sup>

## Example of Watermarking techniques for IPs

- ▶ Physical-level: Constraints based watermarking (map and fitter)
- ▶ Structural level: Constraints based watermarking (synthesis)
- ▶ Algorithm-level: Extract properties by design
- ▶ Behavioral-level : FSM Watermarking

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
<sup>1</sup> NIE, Tingyuan. Performance Evaluation for IP Protection Watermarking Techniques.

# FSM Watermarking



It is the method the most studied to insert a watermark inside digital and synchronous IPs because :

- 1 Most of these kind of IPs contain a FSM,
- 2 The FSM of an IP is difficult to modify without damage the IP.

# Example of techniques




# Example of techniques



## FSM watermarking techniques

- Add new nodes to the FSM





# Example of techniques



## FSM watermarking techniques

- Add new nodes to the FSM
- Add new transitions to the FSM

# Example of techniques



## FSM watermarking techniques

- Add new nodes to the FSM
- Add new transitions to the FSM
- Design the FSM to extract a specific property

# Verification of the Watermark ?

In the case of FSM watermarking, the verification can be difficult and may need:

- An access to a state register
- To reveal explicitly the watermark sequence



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In the case of FSM watermarking, the verification can be difficult and may need:


- An access to a state register
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## Challenge

- Find a general way to extract FSM watermark without reveal information about the original IP.

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# Scenario of Watermark Verification

## Requirements

- ▶ One device containing the original watermarked IP (Golden Device)
- ▶ A set of Device Under Test (DUT)


## Objectives

- ▶ Find which are the devices which contain the watermark IP among the DUTs

# Verification flow

A correlation computation process is defined with 3 functions for the verification flow of the Watermark of the IP.


## Function 1: Power acquisition



# Verification flow

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
## Function 2: Random selection ( $\mathcal{I}$ ) and mean



# Verification flow

A correlation computation process is defined with 3 functions for the verification flow of the Watermark of the IP.

## Function 3: Correlation



# Parameters and Choice

## Correlation process parameters

- $n_1$  : the number of power traces taken over the Golden Device
- $n_2$  : the number of power traces taken over the DUT
- $k$  : the number of averaged traces
- $m$  : the number of correlation coefficient computed

## Requirements for these parameters


- $n_1 \geq k$

- $n_2 \geq k \times m$

Computation time increases with  $m$

Measurement time with  $k$

# Designed IPs






# Experimental Setup

- Implement the four IPs in four Altera Cyclone 3 FPGAs gives the four Golden Devices ( $IP\_A, IP\_B, IP\_C, IP\_D$ )
- Implement the four IPs in four **other** Cyclone 3 FPGAs creates four  $DUTs(DUT_{\#1}, DUT_{\#2}, DUT_{\#3}, DUT_{\#4})$

## Correlation computation parameters

- $k = 50$
- $m = 20$
- $n_1 = 400$
- $n_2 = 10000$

# Result of the Correlation Computation



# Analysis (1/2)

## Choice of the Distinguishers and Definition

### Two Distinguishers

- The Means of the correlation :  $\overline{C_{X,y,k,m}}$
- The Variance of the correlation :  $v(C_{X,y,k,m})$

### Confidence distance: $\Delta_{mean}$ and $\Delta_v$

Indicates the effectiveness of each distiguisher in percentage.

2 functions are defined to create these indicators:

- $max_2(E)$  give the second highest value of a set  $E$
- $min_2(E)$  give the second lowest value of a set  $E$

$$\Delta_{mean}(X) = 100 \times \left[ 1 - \frac{max_2(\{\overline{C_{X,y,k,m}}, y \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\})}{max(\{\overline{C_{X,y,k,m}}, y \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\})} \right]$$

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
- $max_2(E)$  give the second highest value of a set  $E$
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$$\Delta_v(X) = 100 \times \left[ 1 - \frac{\min(\{v(C_{X,y,k,m}), y \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\})}{\min_2(\{v(C_{X,y,k,m}), y \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\})} \right]$$


# Analysis (2/2)

## Results

### Mean of the correlation




### Variance of the correlation




# Analysis (2/2)

## Results

### Mean of the correlation



### Variance of the correlation



# Conclusion

## Verification Algorithm

- Can be applied to verify FSM watermarked IPs
- Insensitive to the Cmos process variations
- The variance of the correlation is a better distinguisher than the mean for the decision

# Thank you for your attention

## Questions ?

Work accepted to the conference socc2014, to reference it:  
C. Marchand, L. Bossuet, and E. Jung, "Ip watermark verification based on power consumption analysis", in SoCC. IEEE, 2014.

