Séminaire de recherche en économie - GATE-LSE : Cintya Lanchimba

Séminaire de recherche en économie - GATE-LSE : Cintya Lanchimba


Salle de réunion 009 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
10, Rue Tréfilerie
42023 Saint Etienne Cedex 2

  • Campus Tréfilerie - GATE LSE - Maison de l'Université Bâtiment B

Cintya Lanchimba, National Polytechnic School, Quito, Ecuador, présentera un séminaire intitulé : Optimal Monetary Provisions and Risk Aversion in Plural Form Franchise Networks : A Model of Incentives with Heterogeneous Agents

Thème de recherche / Main topics : Franchising

Résumé / abstract  :

Existing literature on franchising has extensively studied the presence of plural form distribution networks, where two types of vertical relationships - integration versus franchising - co-exist. However, despite the importance of monetary provisions in franchise contracts, their definition in the case of plural form networks had not been addressed. In this paper, we focus more precisely on the ``share parameters" in integrated (company-owned retail outlet) and decentralized (franchised outlet) vertical contracts, respectively the commission rate and the royalty rate. We develop an agency model of payment mechanism in a two-sided moral hazard context, with one principal and two heterogenous agents distinguished by different levels of risk aversion. We define the optimal monetary provisions, and demonstrate that even in the case of segmented markets, with no correlation between demand shocks, the two rates (commission rate, royalty rate) are negatively interrelated.

Co-auteurs/Joint work with  : Muriel Fadairo & Miguel Yangari