SEMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne : Issofa MOYOUWOU
Le 17 mai 2018
10h45-12h15
Salle de réunion 009 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
10, Rue Tréfilerie
42023 Saint Etienne Cedex 2
Campus Tréfilerie - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Maison de l'Université Bâtiment B
Issofa Moyouwou, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Yaoundé, Cameroun, présentera un séminaire intitulé : How to share a local increment in a TU-game ? A characterization of the Shapley value.
Thème de recherche / Main topics : Game Theory.
Résumé / abstract : Consider a transferable utility game and suppose that the grand coalition is formed with its worth already been shared among players. Assume that only the worth of an active coalition changes. How should the corresponding increment be redistributed ? We provide some new fairness (or equity) norms on how such an increment can be shared. Invariancrence of incrimental share (IIS) requires that individual rewards do not depend on the initial game. Internal/External fairness (IEF) is satisfied when players inside the active coalition receive equal shares as well as players out of that coalition. Balancedness (B) holds when the sum of all individual increments is null whenever the grand coalition is not active. We prove that (IIS), (IEF) and (B) together with the classical dummy condition uniquely characterize the Shapley value. Moreover, further interesting values are attainable by appropriately weakening (or dropping) some of the four axioms. Key Words : TU-game - Value - Fairness - axiomatization - Shapley value.
