SéMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN éCONOMIE - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne : Jean Lainé
Le 20 juin 2019
10h45 - 12h15
Salle de réunion 009 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
10, Rue Tréfilerie
42023 Saint Etienne Cedex 2
Campus Tréfilerie - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne - Maison de l'Université Bâtiment B
Jean Lainé, CNAM- LIRSA , présentera un séminaire intitulé : Strategy-proof preference aggregation.
Thème de recherche / Main topics : Collective Decision Theory, Normative Analysis of Voting Pocedures, Social Choice Theory and Cooperative Game Theory.
Résumé / abstract : We characterize strategy-proof Arrowian aggregation rules where strategy-proofness is defined with respect to preferences over orders (hyper-preferences) that are linear orders. Hyper-preferences are generated from linear orders over alternatives by means of a preference extension. Based on this characterization, we show that some rules that are betweenness strategy-proof (Bossert and Sprumont (2014)) or Kemeny strategy-proof (Athanasoglou (2016)) become manipulable when all pairs of orders can be compared. Moreover, we show that an aggregation rule is strategy-proof for all hyper- preferences in a rich domain if and only if it is either constant or dictatorial. 
Keywords : Aggregation rule - Strategy-proofness - Preference extension Betweenness - Kemeny distance.
