Sém. 17/10/19 A. Salamanca

SéMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN éCONOMIE - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne : Andres Salamanca

10h45 - 12h15

Salle du Conseil  202 (2ème étage)
77 rue Michelet
42023 Saint Etienne

Campus Tréfilerie - GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne

Andres Salamanca, University Southern Denmark, présentera un séminaire intitulé : Random dictatorship and the value of cooperative games with incomplete information.

Résumé / abstract  : In this paper we define a bargaining solution for cooperative games with incomplete information. Our solution concept is inspired in Myerson’s [Mechanism design by an informed principal , Econometrica. (1983), 51, 1767-1797] theory on the informed principal problem and the random dictatorship procedure. It has the essential feature of generalizing the Maschler-Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games. Our main results are individual rationality, incentive (second best) efficiency and existence of our cooperative solution. To obtain these results we restrict our analysis to cooperative games with stochastically independent types, private values and orthogonal coalitions.

Andres Salamanca