Sém. 19/03/20 S. Sémirat

SéMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN éCONOMIE - GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne : Stéphan Sémirat

10h45 - 12h00

Salle du Conseil  202 (2ème étage)
77 rue Michelet
42023 Saint Etienne

Campus Tréfilerie - GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne

Stéphan Sémirat, GAEL, Université Grenoble Alpes, présentera un séminaire intitulé : Strategic information transmission with receiver’s type-dependent decision sets.

Résumé / abstract  : We consider a sender-receiver game, in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes decisions in a bounded real interval. We assume that utility functions are concave, single-peaked and supermodular. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a decision, which must fulfill a constraint (e.g., a participation constraint) that depends on the sender’s type. Hence a necessary equilibrium condition is that the receiver maximizes his expected utility subject to the constraints of all positive probability types. This necessary condition may not hold at the receiver’s prior belief, so that a non-revealing equilibrium may fail to exist. We propose a constructive algorithm that always achieves a partitional perfect Bayesian equilibrium.


- Co-author : Françoise Forges, LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine.

Stéphan Sémirat