SÉMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN ÉCONOMIE - GATE LYON SAINT-ÉTIENNE : Yukihiko Funaki

Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University), présentera un séminaire intitulé : A Characterization of Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Principles: An Efficient Extension Operator Approach.

Résumé / abstract  : Some solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value and the Aumann-Drèze value, lack efficiency, although other desirable properties hold. This paper proposes a new method for sharing the surplus from an underlying solution that extends it to an efficient solution, which we call an efficient extension operator. We  consider a monotonicity property for an efficient extension operator and characterize the egalitarian surplus sharing rule and the proportional division rule in a unified manner. These results can be considered as new justifications for the f -ESS values and the f -PD values introduced by Funaki and Koriyama (2025), which are generalizations of the equal surplus sharing value and the proportional division value, and provide an additional validation for the values with an arbitrary underlying solution. As applications, we consider an efficient-fair extension of the solutions for the TU-games with communication networks and its variant for TU-games with coalition structures.