SÉMINAIRE DE RECHERCHE EN ÉCONOMIE - GATE LYON SAINT-ÉTIENNE : Fabrice Lumineau

Fabrice Lumineau (University of Hong Kong), présentera un séminaire intitulé : " The Architecture of Interfirm Illegality: How Administrative Structure Influences Regulatory Punishment".

Résumé / abstract  :  Corporate illegality involving multiple organizations has significant economic and social costs. However, the relationship between the organization of interfirm illegality and punishment remains a theoretical puzzle. We argue that the administrative structure—encompassing authority, roles, and formalization—supporting interfirm illegality is a double-edged sword: while it enhances coordination and control between lawbreakers, it also produces incriminating evidence that warrants severe penalties from regulators. However, when high-clout lawbreakers are involved, they can leverage their magnitude and influence to mitigate incriminating evidence and subsequently reduce punishment. Our analysis of a unique, multi-source dataset encompassing all cartels prosecuted by the European Commission provides robust support for this theory. Our findings caution against the widely held assumption that the punishment is proportional to the crime, as the level of administrative structure behind interfirm illegality and the lawbreaker’s corporate clout influence the severity of the punishment. We contribute to the literatures on corporate illegality and interfirm relationships.