Séminaire de recherche en économie - GATE L-SE : Ashley Piggins
Le 2 juin 2016
En raison des grèves, le séminaire initialement prévu avec Ashley PIGGINS est annulé.
Salle de réunion 009 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
10, Rue Tréfilerie
42023 Saint Etienne Cedex 2
- Campus Tréfilerie - GATE LSE - Maison de l'Université Bâtiment B
Ashley Piggins, NUI Galway présentera un séminaire intitulé : Oligarchy and soft incompleteness
Thème de recherche / Main topics : Social choice theory, welfare economics, game theory, deliberative democracy
Résumé / abstract :
The assumption that the social preference relation is complete is demanding. We distinguish between ``hard" and ``soft" incompleteness, and explore the social choice implications of the latter. Under soft incompleteness, social preferences can take values in the unit interval. We motivate interest in soft incompleteness by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the context of a [0,1]-valued social preference relation. Using a novel approach to the quasi-transitivity of this relation we prove a general oligarchy theorem. Our framework allows us to make a distinction between a ``strong" and a ``weak" oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable.
Co-auteurs/Joint work with : Conal Duddy