Séminaire de recherche en économie - GATE-LSE : Remzi Sanver

Remzi Sanver , Lamsade, U. Paris Dauphine , présentera un séminaire intitulé :
Non-manipulable collective choice with acceptable and unacceptable candidates

Thème de recherche / Main topics : Social choice theory

Résumé / abstract  :

We consider manipulation of collective decision making rules in a preference-approval framework where voters not only rank candidates but also evaluate them as "acceptable" or "unacceptable". In this richer informational setting, we adopt a new notion of manipulability where incentives of manipulation exist if and only if a voter can ensure to replace an outcome which he finds unacceptable with an acceptable one. Under this definition, we investigate the possibility of efficient, anonymous and non-manipulable rules.

Co-auteurs/Joint work with  : Bora Erdamar & Shin Sato